

Data Mining for Aviation Safety

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


Outline

- The breadth/depth of the problems
- Combining discrete and continuous sequences:
 Multiple Kernel Anomaly Detection (MKAD)
 - Derived from anomaly detection methods on discrete and continuous sequences.
- Text Mining: classification, topic modeling
- Ongoing, future work




Aviation Safety Mapping



From Irving Statler, Aviation Safety Monitoring and Modeling Project




Data Arises from Molecular to Global Scales





Data Mining in Support of Global Operations





Data Mining

- IVHM/SSAT project goals require leveraging substantial data.
 - Aircraft-produced: Sensor data, flight-related data (e.g., origin, destination), covering many flights over many years.
 - Other: Safety reports, trajectories
- Transform data into useful knowledge
 - Tools for Detection, Diagnosis, Prognosis,
 Mitigation
 - Levels ranging from flight-level to national air space level



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Anomalies in Discrete Sequences

- Need to model the behavior of discrete sensors and switches in an aircraft during flight.
- Focus is on primary sensors that record pilot actions.
- The aim is to discover atypical behavior that has possible operational significance.


NA9A

Solution

- We developed sequenceMiner:
 - Each flight is analyzed as a sequence of events, accounting for
 - order in which switches change values
 - frequency of occurrence of switches
- Two Tasks:
 - Given a group of flights, find flights that are anomalous.
 - Given an anomalous flight, describe the anomalies and the degree of anomalousness.
- Method based on techniques used in bioinformatics.

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Bayesian Model



- Sequences S_i in a cluster is dependent on a prototype C
- The outlier O is dependent on the S_i
- Therefore:


$$P(O|C) = \sum_{i} P(O|S_{i}) \times P(S_{i}|C)$$

This forms the basis of our objective function F that allows us to describe why sequences are anomalous.



Missing and Extra Switches

- $P(O|S_i)$ is proportional to the normalized length of the longest common subsequence of O and S_i
 - Discovery of missing and extra symbols is done by aligning the sequences
- Missing and extra symbols are those whose addition to or deletion from an outlier sequence O would make O more normal with respect to the objective function *F*





SequenceMiner

Normalized Longest Common Subsequence (NLCS)

$$\frac{L(h(s_i, s_j))}{\sqrt{L(s_i) \times L(s_j)}}$$

where the functions h(.) and L(.) calculate the longest common subsequence and length of the sequences.

Switch Activations during a Change to a Parallel Runway



(NOTE: Approximately same time interval as previous slide)

											seco	nds	to to	uch	dowr	1										
	600	600	365	365	364	364	364	359	359	359	358	358	351	309	309	309	309	309	309	308	308	308	302	288	275	258
on																										
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off						lacksquare	▼					lacksquare													lacksquare	
	AP_Heading_Select_Mode	AP_LNAV_Mode	AP_Localizer_Engaged	Autothrottle_Engaged	AP_Engaged_L	AP_Engaged_R	AP_Heading_Select_Mode	AP_Engaged_L	AP_Engaged_R	Flight_Director_On_R	AP_Engaged_L	AP_Engaged_R	AP_Glide_Slope_Engage	AP_Engaged_L	AP_Engaged_R	AP_Glide_Slope_Engage	AP_Localizer_Engaged	Flight_Director_On_L	Flight_Director_On_R	AP_Engaged_L	AP_Engaged_R	Flight_Director_On_L	AP_Localizer_Engaged	AP_Glide_Slope_Engage	Flight_Director_On_R	AP_Approach_Mode
	~	✓ = out of sequence switch activation detected by sequenceMiner																								

SME opinion: Possible evidence of mode confusion.



MKAD for Fleet wide analysis

Flight Data Monitoring


Sequences D and continuous data streams C interactions

How to integrate all information in a <u>concise</u> and <u>intuitive</u> manner?

Compression,
Feature extraction,
Fusion,
Anomaly detection




MKAD Framework






SAX Representation



First convert the time series to Piecewise Aggregate Approximation (PAA) representation, then convert to symbols


It takes linear time



Slide courtesy of Eamonn Keogh and Jessica Lin

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Optimization problem



minimize
$$Q = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i,j} \alpha_i \alpha_j \left(\beta \underline{K_d} \left(x_i, x_j \right) + (1 - \beta) \underline{K_c} \left(x_i, x_j \right) \right)$$

subject to $0 \le \alpha_i \le \frac{1}{\ell \nu}, \quad \nu \in [0, 1], \quad \sum_i \alpha_i = 1$

Discrete kernel

Continuous kernel

In the objective function, each entry of the discrete kernel and the continuous kernel represents the score obtained using longest common subsequence (LCS) of discrete signals and SAXified continuous signals, respectively.



Pairwise Similarity Measure

Kernel on discrete: Normalized Longest Common Subsequence (NLCS)

$$K_d(f_i, f_j) = \frac{L(h(s_i, s_j))}{\sqrt{L(s_i) \times L(s_j)}}$$

Kernel on continuous: Inversely proportional to distance between SAX representations of sequences

General Case, Multiple Kernels



One class SVMs training algorithms require solving the quadratic problem

Dual form

$$\min Q = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i,j} \alpha_i \alpha_j \left(\sum_{\lambda} \beta_{\lambda} K_{\lambda} (x_i, x_j) \right)$$

Subject to:

$$\sum_{i} \alpha_{i} = 1$$

$$v \in [0,1]$$

$$0 \le \alpha_i \le \frac{1}{lv}, \forall i$$

Linear equality constraint

Control parameter

Bounds on design variables

Also:
$$\sum_{\lambda} \beta_{\lambda} = 1$$

lpha : Lagrange multipliers of the primal QP problem



Anomaly scores

Decision boundary is determined only by margin and non-margin support vectors obtained by solving the QP problem

$$h(\alpha, \beta, f_z, \rho) = \sum_{i} \alpha_i \left(\sum_{\lambda} \beta_{\lambda} K_{i,z}^{\lambda} \right) - \rho$$

Datapoints with $\alpha_k > 0$ will be the support vectors

Indicator

Sign of h: if negative - outlier if positive - normal


Magnitude of h: degree of normality/anomalousness





Synthetic Experiment


Simulation data

- Type 1 (Missing event) Flaps were not extended to normal full deployment at landing.
- Type 2 (Extra event) Landing gear was retracted after being deployed on final approach.
- Type 3 (Out of order event) Gear deployed before initial flaps below flaps limit.
- Type 4 (Continuous anomaly) High bank angles or rate of descent below 1,000 ft.










Case study: FOQA anomaly detection



 The tradition methods cannot detect and monitor these anomalous activities that may have occurred simultaneously and are heterogeneous in nature.

Normal Extra Missing

Flaps1 On
Landing_Gear_Sel_Dwn On
Flaps2 On
FlapsFull On
Ground_Spoilers_Deployed On
Landing_Gear_Sel_Dwn Off
FlapsFull Off
Flaps2 Off
Flaps1 Off
Flaps1 On
Landing_Gear_Sel_Dwn On
Flaps2 On
FlapsFull On

MKAD Summary



Performs

.... anomaly detection on multivariate mixed attributes where discrete may influences the system dynamics which is reflected on the continuous data streams.

Application

- 1. Support flights safety experts
- 2. Schedule maintenance

Highlights

- .. High detection rate on most operationally significant anomalies in fleet wide analysis on large datasets
- .. Discover some "unknown unknowns"

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Aviation Safety Text Reports



- Pilots are encouraged to report incidents, concerns, or unsafe conditions. Two repositories:
 - The NASA-FAA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS).
 - Each individual airline has an Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP).
- Reports can be analyzed to improve aviation safety.
- Reports need to be correctly and consistently categorized by event type to determine dangerous situations and track trends of incidents and events.
- Event types are not enough to capture all anomalies. Topic identification needed to identify new event types, combinations of event types.

Manually Classifying Reports



- Review and analysis of reports is labor intensive.
 - In ASRS, reviewers have classified about 135,000 ASRS reports of 715,000 total reports submitted into 60 overlapping anomaly categories.
 - The length of the reports range from 0.5-4 pages long.
 - ASRS reports accrue at about 3,000 per month.
 - Classifications not always consistent due to multiple reviewers, changing experiences.
- Historical reports must be reread when new categories are added or changed.
- Current systems rely heavily on human memories for historical perspectives.



ASRS Report Excerpt

JUST PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN, LAX TWR TOLD US
TO GO AROUND BECAUSE OF THE ACFT IN FRONT
OF US. BOTH THE COPLT AND I, HOWEVER,
UNDERSTOOD TWR TO SAY, 'CLRED TO LAND, ACFT
ON THE RWY.' SINCE THE ACFT IN FRONT OF US
WAS CLR OF THE RWY AND WE BOTH
MISUNDERSTOOD TWR'S RADIO CALL AND
CONSIDERED IT AN ADVISORY, WE LANDED...

Note: Industry specific vocabulary and abbreviations.



Automatic Categorization of ASRS Reports

A single report can be in multiple categories.


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MISUNDERSTOOD TWR'S
RADIO CALL AND
CONSIDERED IT AN
ADVISORY, WE LANDED...

Sample of 60 ASRS Anomaly Categories


Non Adherence to ATC Clearance Critical Equipment Problem **Runway Incursion** Landing without a Clearance Air Space Violation **Altitude Deviation Overshoot** Fumes Altitude Deviation Undershoot Ground Encounter, Less Severe

Mariana Statistical Model **Optimization Flowchart**



Mariana vs. Methods using Natural Language Processing





The Mariana algorithm can give substantially better results over other methods (green box), even when processing raw text.

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Subspace Approximation



Goals


- System often assumed explainable by simple model plus noise. Construction of simple approximation may reduce noise.
- Derive small, key set of features to explain system behavior.
- Lower storage requirements.

Issue

 Derived features more intuitive if they are positive, reflecting presence of key components that add up to characterize the item of interest.

Non-negative Matrix Factorization

- NMF finds factors
 representing parts of
 faces (e.g., nose,
 mouth). Easy to
 interpret.
- Vector Quantization and PCA find holistic representations (face +/- other stuff).
 Difficult to interpret.



Non-negative Matrix Factorization

Problem: Given a nonnegative matrix $A \in R^{mxn}$ and a positive integer $k < \min\{m,n\}$ find nonnegative matrices to minimize $W \in R^{mxk}, H \in R^{kxn}$

$$f(W,H) = \frac{1}{2} ||A - WH||_F^2$$

WH is a nonnegative matrix factorization. Columns of W represent k basis vectors captured from n examples having m feature values each. H gives factor-example weights. k is problem-specific and chosen by user.

N-43A

NMF for classification

- NMF factors can be used for clustering, classification, regression.
- Classification of ASAP reports into one or more contributing factors.

$$f(W_T, H_T) = \frac{1}{2} ||A_T - W_T H_T||_F^2$$
$$f(H_E) = \frac{1}{2} ||A_E - W_T H_E||_F^2$$
$$C_E \leftarrow H_E^T \setminus (H_T C_T)$$



Basis Vector 2

TECHNICIAN

JOBCARD

Basis Vector 1

CALCULATE

EMPTY

NASA


Run 1	2	3	1	2	3
FUE	L FUEL	FUEL	INSTALL	INSTALL	INSTALL
TANI	K TANK	TANK	INSPECT	INSPECT	REMOVE
POUNI	POUND	POUND	REMOVE	REMOVE	REPLACE
GALLO	N GALLON	GALLON	REPLACE	MECHANIC	ENGINEER
GAUG	E GAUGE	GAUGE	MECHANIC	REPLACE	MANUAL
PUM	P PUMP	PUMP	FOUND	PART	INSPECT
FUELTANI	K BURN	BURN	WORK	MANUAL	WORK
BURN	N FUELTANK	FUELTANK	MANUAL	WORK	SHIFT
FUELEI	R FUELER	FUELER	REPAIR	REPAIR	FOUND
FUELQUANTITY	T FUELQUANTITY	FUELQUANTITY	PART	FOUND	ASSEMBLE
CENTE	R CENTER	CENTER	ENGINEER	SIGN	TECHNICIAN
MAINTANI	X DISPATCH	FUELGAUGE	TEST	ENGINEER	REPORT
FUELGAUG!	E FUELGAUGE	MAINTANK	CHECK	NUMBER	PANEL
IMBA]	L MAINTANK	IMBAL	SHIFT	SHIFT	REPAIR
REFUE	L IMBAL	REFUEL	SIGN	MAINTAIN	JOB
CROSSFEEI	REFUEL	PLAN	ASSEMBLE	TEST	XYZ
QUANTITY	QUANTITY	CALCULATE	MAINTAIN	ASSEMBLE	BOLT
BALANC	E PLAN	CROSSFEED	SERVE	AIRCRAFT	CARD
CALCULAT	E CROSSFEED	BALANCE	CARD	XYZ	LEAK

EMPTY

TECHNICIAN



ASRS Classification Results



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Ongoing, Future Work

- Anomaly detection over discrete, continuous, and text (utilize when available, don't penalize when not).
- Anomaly cause/precursor identification.
- Prediction over multiple scales: within flight, across flights, across fleets over years.

How Does Human Performance Affect Aviation Safety?





Spinal cord

Brachial plexus

Musculocutaneous

Cerebellum

intercostal nerves



Luton, UK

To EasyJet
Near realtime decision
support

Understanding

To NASA Data Mining Team
Daily data
300 GB flights per month
Physiology, text, cockpit,
engines and flight
parameters, flight path,

network information.

Sample Text Report JUST PRIOR TO


TOUCHDOWN,

LAX TWR

TOLD US TO GO AROUND BECAUSE OF

THE ACFT IN

US. ...



NASA Data Mining Lab (Mountain View, CA)



Multiple Kernel Anomaly Detection (KDD 2010)

* Diagram for notional purposes only



Mining Heterogeneous Data is the Key

Primary Source: aircraft Can answer **what** happened in an aircraft during an Aviation Safety

Discrete

Primary Source:
Humans. Can answer
why an Aviation Safety
Incident happened



Continuous

 $K(x_i,x_j)$

Textual

Sample Text
Report


JUST PRIOR
TO
TOUCHDOWN,
LAX TWR
TOLD US TO
GO AROUND
BECAUSE OF
THE ACFT IN
FRONT OF
US. ...

Primary Source: Radar data. Can answer what happened in the National Airspace during Aviation Safety Incident

Networks

Massive Data: Archives growing at 100K flights per month.

The Anatomy of an Aviation Safety Incident





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DASHlink

disseminate. collaborate. innovate. https://dashlink.arc.nasa.gov/


DASHlink is a collaborative website designed to promote:

- Sustainability
- Reproducibility
- Dissemination
- Community building

Users can create profiles

- Share papers, upload and download opensource algorithms
- Find NASA data sets.

Coming Soon... DASHlink 2.0.



Conference on Intelligent Data Understanding - 2010

Call for Participation

- Conference focused on theory and applications of data mining and machine learning to Earth Science, Space Science, Engineering Systems
- Location: Computer History
 Museum, Mountain View, CA
- Date: October 5-6, 2010
- Registration: Free

- Steering Committee
 - Ashok Srivastava (chair)
 - Stephen Boyd
 - Jiawei Han
 - Eamonn Keogh
 - Vipin Kumar
 - Zoran Obradovic
 - Nikunj Oza
 - Raghu Ramakrishnan
 - Ramasamy Uthurusamy
 - Ramasubbu Venkatesh
 - Xindong Wu

Program Chairs: Nitesh Chawla and Philip Yu



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 Multiple kernel learning for heterogeneous anomaly detection: algorithm and aviation safety case study, in KDD 2010.
- Nikunj C. Oza, J. Patrick Castle, and John Stutz, Classification of Aeronautics System Health and Safety Documents, in IEEE SMC Part C, 39(6), 2009.